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Abstract
Background: EU regulation 726/2004 authorises manufacturers to provide drugs to patients on a temporary basis
when marketing authorisation sought centrally for the entire EU is still pending. Individual Member States retain the
right to approve and implement such ‘compassionate use’ programmes which companies will usually provide for
free. Nevertheless some companies have opted not to partake in such programmes, in effect restricting access to
drugs for patients in need. Here we survey the state of compassionate use programmes in the EU with particular
reference to the rare disease field, and provide legal and ethical arguments to encourage their increased
compassionate use in the EU and beyond. We contend that if enacted, these recommendations will be mutually
beneficial to companies as well as patients.
Methods: Requests for information from the European Medicines Agency were made under the UK Freedom of
Information Act 2000. Legal, ethical and economic/pragmatic analysis identified means by which provision of
therapy in compassionate use programmes might be increased.
Results: More than 50 notifications of compassionate use programmes have been submitted to the EMA by
Member States since 2006. About 40 % relate to orphan drugs. As there is a compulsory register of programmes
but not of outcomes, their success is difficult to evaluate but, for example, the French programme expedited
treatment for more than 20,000 (orphan and non-orphan) patients over a period of three years.
Conclusion: Compelling self-interested, legal and ethical arguments can be mounted to encourage manufacturers
to offer therapies on a compassionate use basis and these are often equally applicable to provision on a
humanitarian aid basis. The EU’s compassionate use programmes are instrumental in ensuring continuity of access
to drugs until approval and reimbursement decisions are finalised. We propose the creation of a registry of drugs
offered on a compassionate use basis; further transparency would allow such programmes to be evaluated and
direct patients to sources of treatment.
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Background
‘Compassionate use’ refers to a manufacturer providing
a therapeutic product, often without charge, to patients
in need on a temporary basis. When phase 3 drug trials
are coming to completion or when marketing authorisa-
tion is pending, this practice of making a drug available
on compassionate grounds is quite frequent in the
United States and European countries. A noteworthy ex-
ample was provided by Glaxo-Wellcome in the 1990s:
while phase 3 clinical trials were in progress, the com-
pany donated its AIDS drug, ziduvidine, free of charge
to 22,000 patients [1]. In the setting of rare diseases, the
Genzyme Corporation generously donates imiglucerase
for life-saving treatment of hundreds of severely affected
patients with Gaucher Disease in three large-scale inter-
national compassionate use programmes.
Not all companies contribute (substantially) to com-
passionate initiatives of this kind, thus raising the ques-
tion as to why should a profit-making enterprise donate
a drug? This article surveys the state of compassionate
use programmes in the EU, and explores how provision
of commercial drugs compassionately by a pharmaceut-
ical company can be viewed as an activity of enlightened
self-interest; we also set out legal and ethical arguments
which, we argue, compel such provision. We draw here
on examples principally from the European Union and
medicines for rare, ‘orphan’ disorders as this is our area* Correspondence: hannaihyry@gmail.com1Department of Medicine, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 0QQ, UK
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of expertise; nonetheless the arguments adduced apply
equally to treatments for more common debilitating or
life-threatening conditions.
In the EU and beyond, compassionate use can also
offer a critical life-line to patients where a country strug-
gles to offer basic medical care and is unable to purchase
expensive life-saving drugs. There may also be extraor-
dinary circumstances such as earthquakes which disrupt
medical services and transport routes, or shortages of
supply due to production difficulties.
The detailed definitions of and differences between i)
compassionate use (product not yet licensed, or newly li-
cenced), ii) off-label use (product licensed but prescribed
for a different indication) and iii) clinical trials (legal re-
quirement prior to gaining marketing authorisation) are
further summarised in Additional file 1: Table S1. Hu-
manitarian provision is often distinguished from com-
passionate use as explained further in Additional file 1:
Table S1. However, we also test the soundness of this
distinction and contend that the arguments expounded
below apply in many instances to humanitarian aid. For
the purposes of this article they are thus treated
similarly.
Of note, the EU is piloting within the compassionate
use framework an ‘adaptive pathways approach’. This in-
volves an iterative and dynamic approach to collection of
evidence and consequent licence adaptations that will fa-
cilitate speedy access to life-saving medications – drugs
which may, for example, involve conditional regulatory
approval [2]. If the approach allows life-saving medica-
tions to gain marketing authorisation more quickly, this
may ultimately shorten the duration for which provision
based on compassionate use is required.
Methods
This article contains a legal, ethical and economic/prag-
matic analysis to identify means by which provision of
therapy in compassionate use programmes might be in-
creased, drawing on examples principally from the Euro-
pean Union and medicines for rare, 'orphan'
disorders. The article also presents and analyses data
obtained from the European Medicines Agency under
the UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 concerning
compassionte use programmes.
The state of ‘compassionate use’ in the EU
To minimise health risk to patients, medicines must ob-
tain marketing authorisation before being sold in the EU
(Directive 2001/83). After completion of trials demon-
strating safety, tolerability and efficacy of a new agent,
final authorisation can still take many months to
achieve; in the French experience 11 months on average
[3]. There follows a further time lag for distribution of
the drug into the EU market. This period can range
from a few months in Germany and the UK (which do
not regulate launch prices) to 11 and 12 months in
France and Italy, where reimbursement pricing has to be
negotiated first. [3] Indeed, individual Member States re-
tain autonomy and may delay or not approve a drug for
local reimbursement. Once an authorised and approved
drug is available, patients may struggle to secure insur-
ance cover or the drug may not yet be approved by hos-
pital formularies, adding further delay.
We contend elsewhere that public and private health
providers should offer life-saving treatments once they
are thus available in the market [4, 5]. However, if a pa-
tient has no alternative treatment available in the mean-
time, they will be deprived effective treatment of their
disease. This can be a particular difficulty for patients
suffering from rare diseases for two reasons. First, the
historic neglect of rare diseases means few if any treat-
ments exist. Second, once an orphan drug gains market-
ing authorisation, it secures a statutory monopoly
position which precludes the authorisation of other
treatments for 10 years, subject to limited exceptions
such as a subsequent treatment being safer, more effect-
ive or otherwise clinically superior [6]. The patient is
therefore reliant on that treatment being made available.
In response, EU Regulation 726/2004 creates an expli-
cit exemption from the marketing authorisation require-
ment for compassionate use (see Additional file 2: Table
S2 for details including the official definition of compas-
sionate use pursuant to Article 83 [7-10]). The aim of
the exemption is thought to be temporary until the
treatment is launched in the market, although we note
that Article 83 makes no express reference to the tem-
porary basis (see Additional file 2: Table S2). A model
for the Regulation came inter alia from France in the
early 1990s in response to the AIDS pandemic while
clinical trials were still ongoing [1]. The French exemp-
tion programme shortened the time that patients wait to
start treatment, by 36 months [3]; since 2007 this ex-
emption programme has expedited the treatment of
more than 20,000 patients treated with over 200 drugs
[11]. But the stance taken by EU Member States to com-
passionate use varies greatly, with for example Ireland,
Sweden and the UK having no formal compassionate
use programme and Hungary having no programme at
all [12].
Since the enactment of the EU Regulation, which
allows but does not require countries to have such
compassionate use programmes, Member States have
sent altogether 41 notifications of compassionate use
programmes, 17 (41 %) of which are for orphan drugs
(Additional file 3: Table S3 [13]). Figure 1 illustrates,
with Gaucher Disease as an example, that some EU
and other countries rely greatly on compassionate use
for treating their patients [14].
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The pathways for accessing an orphan therapy in the
EU are summarised in Fig. 2.
Justification for compassionate provision
We suggest that it can be in the interest of pharmaceut-
ical companies to offer a drug to patients on a compas-
sionate use basis. We contend that taken together, the
pragmatic and ethical arguments explored below present
a persuasive case for compassionate use provision.
First, such provision tends to fit squarely within corpor-
ate social responsibility programmes.
Second, while the primary aim of compassionate use
provision is not data generation, the experience can provide
invaluable clinical data particularly in rare diseases
which are investigated in trials which often comprise
relatively few patients. Clinical data obtained from
compassionate use supply further ‘real world’ infor-
mation about responses in patients who may not
meet rigid entry criteria for clinical trials. Clearly,
late-phase clinical trials in this field are designed
principally to investigate efficacy using protocols that
regulators approve but for this reason, often exclude
patients with advanced disease or co-morbidities. All EU
countries maintain a register of unwanted effects arising
from compassionate use programmes. These may allow
identification of unwanted effects and interactions with
other prescribed drugs at an early stage, thereby refining
the indications and guidance for prescribing as well as the
costs of litigation [15, 16].
Of note, the new EU Clinical Trials Regulation,
signed into law in April 2014 and expected to come
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Fig. 1 Proportion of Gaucher Patients per country receiving their treatment on a compassionate (humanitarian) use basis. Data from selected
countries showing the proportion of Gaucher Patients receiving treatment on a compassionate (humanitarian) use basis
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Fig. 2 Pathways for accessing an orphan therapy in the EU. A schematic illustration of how an orphan therapy can be accessed in the EU
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requires drug companies to publish detailed trial data.
Companies might therefore opt to run smaller trials
on those highly selected patients most likely to show
benefit (provided they can continue to demonstrate
that, despite the smaller size, the data are robust),
and then provide their drug on a compassionate use
basis for the remainder of patients whilst being reim-
bursed (in most states) and not requiring declaration
of those results as they would nor form part of a
trial. This development should be monitored, as the
Regulation states that compassionate use programmes
are not a substitute for clinical trials [17] (see also
Additional file 2: Table S2).
Third, compassionate use may provide rapid access to
revenue where national legislation allows for reim-
bursement. In France, hospital pharmacies can pay the
full price to manufacturers for compassionate use treat-
ments – indeed companies set a 12 % premium on
therapies sold through this programme [3]. On the
other hand, Germany amended its legislation for com-
passionate use in 2009 so that such agents must be pro-
vided free of charge [11]. The authors appreciate that
the example of policy action in France is an instance of
a government “taking charge” of a compassionate use
programme to allow for reimbursement. Companies
and patients may wish to lobby for similar legislation in
other countries to yield a programme which visibly
benefits both companies and patients.
Fourth, for commercial reasons a company may prefer
to donate a drug rather than sell at a discounted rate to
individual countries [6]. Any price discrepancy could
prompt requests from more affluent countries to reduce
their drug cost. With such a precedent, a company
might well find it difficult if not impossible to justify
price discrimination – a state of affairs in which it might
eventually have to offer the discounted price to all pa-
tients in the EU, and with significant consequences for
profits. Donating the drug for free avoids downward har-
monisation of pricing.
Fifth, there are often long-term strategic advantages for
companies and their political counterparts involved in
provision of health care in countries which are presently
too poor to pay for expensive orphan medicinal products.
Administration of biologic agents and management of
chronic diseases requires investment in expertise and
medical services beyond basic pharmacy. Development of
the required infrastructure and staff facilities is predicated
on bilateral investments contracted with the investing
company – and an accompanying platform for enhanced
and realistic market investment, thereby helping to foster
a market where previously there was none. This has been
the case for Gaucher disease in Romania where a humani-
tarian aid programme has now created a viable market in
which companies are now generating revenue.
Sixth, offering a drug on a compassionate basis can
help establish an early market presence in affluent coun-
tries as it allows doctors to familiarise themselves with
the new drug and manufacturers to establish relation-
ships with specialist doctors, government departments,
hospitals, charities, and where relevant, insurance com-
panies, as part of market development and, ultimately,
commercial dominance. This can be the case particularly
during an “expanded access programme” meaning a
period after the trial ends and before the drug becomes
available for distribution. Similarly, the Regulation en-
sures that patients taking part in a compassionate use
programme have access to the treatment during the
period between authorisation and placing on the market
(see Additional file 2: Table S2).
Some companies cite difficulties in entering a country
with the given agent as a reason for not engaging with
compassionate use provision; but patient organisations
may have on-the-ground presence and be able to make
introductions – and otherwise facilitate entry through
activities in popular media and occasionally through pol-
itical lobbying.
Seventh, and related, compassionate use establishes
good will with the stakeholders listed above, allowing net-
works to protect the manufacturer should a competitor
seek to sell an alternative therapy for the same condition:
patients and other involved parties would probably wish
to buy the drug from the company and individuals already
operating in the market, unless a new agent is demon-
strably superior. This argument does not envisage sinister
“blocking” of the market, but simply reflects on the prac-
tical reality that a patient and his physician are likely to
prefer an existing therapy that is effective to a new, un-
tried therapy which may be of uncertain efficacy and
unknown side effects.
On this last point, subsequent market entrants may
also benefit from contributing to compassionate pro-
grammes. As an example, when global production of
imiglucerase was compromised in 2009, two rival
manufacturers with licensed enzyme preparations that
had yet to receive marketing approval were asked by
EMA (and the FDA) to make up the shortfall, requir-
ing them to accelerate their development, regulatory
approval and scale-up of their bioreactor production
facilities [18]. In effect, this meant investing in pro-
duction and distribution of a life-saving treatment in
the absence of marketing authorisation (thus meeting
the definition of compassionate use provision in Art-
icle 83(2) – see Additional file 2: Table S2 and [8]).
This was initially a commercially attractive opportun-
ity for these manufacturers; they later secured mar-
keting authorisation for their drug as part of the
negotiations with the authorities so that they could
begin to sell their drug in the EU and US.
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It is noteworthy, however, that while taliglucerase-alfa,
the enzyme preparation for Gaucher disease developed
through a novel protein expression system in plant cells
by Protalix Biotherapeutics gained approval by the FDA,
it was not approved in Europe by EMA. Here, the prece-
dent and hence gain of marketing exclusivity as an or-
phan medicinal product was lost to velaglucerase-alfa,
the biologic now marketed by Shire. Thus in the unusual
setting of late-phase competition in an ultra-orphan dis-
ease, the incentive proved to be far less clear for com-
panies who do not succeed in securing authorisation, as
in this case where there was no prospect of attaining any
share of the market after the compassionate use
provision ended.
These examples of what one might call self-interested
reasons for compassionate use do not appear to have
convinced all manufacturers to initiate (or contribute to)
compassionate use programmes. Here we explore several
legal and ethical principles that can be adduced to justify
more extensive introduction of the practice.
Legal mechanisms to encourage compassionate use
We contend elsewhere that human rights and disability
legislation require governments to reimburse the costs
of orphan medicinal treatments [4], but these appeals
ring hollow if a country is too poor to offer its citizens
more than the most rudimentary care. At first, it also
seems difficult to argue that a company has a legal obli-
gation to give away drugs for free. However, a case can
be made for how such an obligation can be created on
three levels: (i) regional or government level, (ii) between
two or more orphan drug manufacturers, and (iii) be-
tween the manufacturer and patients. These are set out
in detail in Additional file 4: Table S4 and [19]. In brief:
i) Mechanisms on a regional and governmental level.
The EU could amend its orphan drug legislation to
state that orphan designation after marketing
authorisation is only maintained if the company
undertakes to ensure provision of drug (free or at a
reduced rate) for those EU Members States with a
Gross Domestic Product below a certain low limit
(for example Romania and Bulgaria or the countries
in Fig. 1), or those States experiencing severe
recession (for example Greece where treatment
cessation is feared to have led to deaths [20]) or are
otherwise demonstrably unable to pay for the
treatment.
As this could place a considerable burden on a com-
pany, the legislation could permit tax relief for costs as-
sociated with compassionate use; small and medium
companies already obtain fee reductions on administra-
tive fees under Regulation 2049/2005. We would
however expect resistance to such amendment: the per-
ception is that manufacturers prefer not to disclose the
details of their compassionate provision for fear of being
asked to provide the drugs for free more widely, and are
therefore unlikely to want to accept a legal obligation
which makes such programmes official and mandatory.
ii) Mechanisms on a manufacturer level. The terms of
agreement of industry groups such as the European
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and
Associations (EFPIA) and similar organisations
around the world could specify that, where more
than one company sells a drug for the same
condition, each manufacturer must make its best
effort to partake in a compassionate use programme.
The details of provision could be governed by a non-
disclosure agreement between the manufacturers if
they are concerned that publicity around the details
of provision encourages patient organisations to de-
mand free provision more widely. Agreements to
share the burden of provision will however not assist
patients where only a single drug exists for a condi-
tion, which is the case, almost by definition, for most
orphan diseases.
iii)Mechanisms on a patient level. Action by patient
organizations is best. EU Regulation 726/2004
provides that patients taking part in a compassionate
use programme continue to have access to the
treatment between the time when the drug gains
marketing authorisation and its full entry on the
market (Art 83(8)). Patients who participate in
clinical trials (distinct from compassionate use – see
Fig. 2) sometimes partake in an expanded access
programme when the trial ends and before the drug
becomes available for distribution, but there is no
legal obligation on the company to offer such
continued expanded access programme. Individual
patients wishing to join a clinical trial have little
power to negotiate the terms under which they
participate.
However, there are influential umbrella organizations
often representing large populations of patients: EURO-
RDIS in the EU or NORD in the US are examples. These
organisations have strong bargaining positions, as do
charities underwriting the costs of research trials. More-
over, the EU Clinical Trials Directive 2001/20 requires
that each trial participant gives his or her consent to the
conditions and risks of the trial in writing. Patient orga-
nisations could demand that all consent agreements en-
tered into going forward contain a new clause that is
identical between individual consent agreements. The
clause could specify that each trial participant or disease
registry member, including those on a placebo, are to be
Hyry et al. Orphanet Journal of Rare Diseases  (2015) 10:100 Page 5 of 9
given the drug (or, in the case of multi-arm trials, the
most effective drug) for free following a trial until the
patient’s public or private health plan covers it. Such a
clause would be consistent with the Declaration of
Helsinki of the World Medical Association setting out
ethical principles regarding trials, and provides that
In advance of a clinical trial, sponsors, researchers
and host country governments should make provisions
for post-trial access for all participants who still need
an intervention identified as beneficial in the trial.
This information must also be disclosed to participants
during the informed consent process [21]. (Emphasis
added.)
Such a contract with patients or their organizations
would also create an inducement for companies to
negotiate rapidly a reasonable reimbursement scheme
with care providers, lest they continue supplying drug
for free longer than necessary. Simultaneously, safe-
guards would need to exist to stop companies from
being taken advantage of by a care provider’s refusal
or delay in paying for treatment. A company might
for example be able to bring a judicial review request
against a public authority’s refusal to purchase a treat-
ment, although victory in judicial review is very un-
certain and the merit of each case would have to be
assessed carefully in each case [4].
Once patients have been recruited to and given con-
sent for a given clinical trial, this bargaining chip for pa-
tient organizations and related charities disappears
because the patients have already consented to take part.
Early and concerted action by patient organisations is
therefore essential.
Ethical reasons for offering orphan drugs for free
The term “compassionate” use conveys the idea that
companies exceptionally donate a life-saving drug be-
cause the plight of the patient (often a child) elicits a
feeling of compassion. Irrespective of the reality that
only a few drugs are life-saving and indeed that not all
patients with rare conditions have truly life-threatening
conditions, it is useful to consider whether this senti-
ment can be crystallized into a coherent ethical theory.
The so-called principles of “beneficence” and “rule of
rescue” are not satisfactory expressions of this sentiment
since they are arbitrary and place an undue burden on
patients who may lack the resources to render them-
selves identifiable on a sufficient scale. A more objective
and generally applicable alternative can be found in John
Rawls’ Theory of Justice, which provides a cogent basis
for the argument that individual countries (or their pri-
vate health plans) should pay for expensive orphan drugs
[5, 22]. Rawls (1921–2002) does not specifically address
whether a for-profit drug company has a responsibility
to patients, and perhaps extending to patients in other
countries where it may not even operate. Rawls is solely
concerned with justice for societies and countries and
his theory of international justice is not concerned with
the well-being of individuals or the arbitrariness of their
fates [23]. However Kant and Aristotle are two other
moral philosophers who offer reasons to donate a life-
saving drug for free.
The writings of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) are
important in contemporary Western philosophy and
he greatly influenced Rawls. Kant argues that morally
right actions are those done for reasons that are in-
trinsically ‘right’ and which are commonly accepted
human societal behaviours. We should give away a
drug for free not because the compassionate act gives
us a warm feeling, but because humans have inde-
pendent value [24]. Kant’s rule of thumb is: act in
such a way that you always treat humanity, whether
yourself or others, not as a means but as an end
[24]. Providing a life-saving drug for free on a tem-
porary basis arguably respects humanity as an end.
Refusing to provide would be disrespectful to human
life as patients would suffer and some would prob-
ably die prematurely.
Aristotle (384–322 BC) argues, perhaps in a more ac-
cessible manner, that we should do what makes us happy
[25]. But happiness for Aristotle was not a loose and
relative concept of hedonistic pleasure or power. He de-
fines happiness strictly: acting virtuously. Aristotle dif-
fered from Socrates and Plato in emphasising that
merely having a virtue is not enough. One should also
act virtuously. A central pillar of virtue, says Aristotle, is
moderation. For example in giving money – or in our
case life-saving drugs – we should neither be profligate
nor miserly, for both are undesirable extremes. Instead,
we should aim to be generous [25]. A drug company
should establish a compassionate use programme be-
cause it is a generous, and virtuous, action.
The strength of Kant’s and Aristotle’s ideas is that they
envisage compassionate use provision in and beyond the
EU to patients where it is needed – in the case of treat-
ments for Gaucher disease, most recently India, Pakistan,
South America, Egypt and Africa. A company might ob-
ject that business organizations cannot be regarded as nat-
ural persons capable of happiness, but of course those
working for a company are, and it is their and their pa-
tients’ happiness that Aristotle would have wished to
ensure.
A biopharmaceutical company might also respond
that its shareholders are interested in profit, not
virtue, and that profit may be used in numerous
ways that are virtuous but determined by the inven-
tors and employees of that organization. However,
Hyry et al. Orphanet Journal of Rare Diseases  (2015) 10:100 Page 6 of 9
Aristotle promulgates the view that seeking instru-
mental goods – such as money – as an end goal
leads away from a good life [25].
And here Aristotle perhaps inadvertently offers a
perceptive management strategy: because people are
fulfilled and perform best when they feel moral satis-
faction [26], the company should have a practical
interest in creating opportunities that promote virtu-
ous activities on the part of its employees. It might
offer for example a chance to participate in organiz-
ing a compassionate use programme for a country
where patients currently receive no treatment for de-
bilitating and life-threatening conditions.
Thus, even if a company is unmoved by the philoso-
phy of moral rectitude, it makes business sense to heed
the recommendations of Kant and Aristotle – though
strictly speaking this is a reason borne out of what one
might term enlightened self-interest, a matter that we
have explored here under the first heading above.
On a related point, some pharmaceutical companies
cite the lack of local medical expertise and basic health-
care infrastructure required for administering a given
agent as a barrier to offering free compassionate treat-
ment. Accordingly, companies could establish pro-
grammes to train those charged with prescribing and
administering their life-saving drug.
The challenge is that for such programmes to be truly
life-saving, they must be long-term. Delivering a treat-
ment on an urgent, short-term basis may capture head-
lines but even if it were highly efficacious, the
intervention will not yield permanently improved out-
comes. More is required than the treatment itself: there
should also be in place a system for managing and moni-
toring the provision of treatment to improve care over
the patient’s lifetime. Development of local medical ser-
vices is a critical factor in ensuring that treatment is
used appropriately and is effective in the long-term. The
company should also be ready to engage in protracted
negotiations with authorities to secure licences and per-
mission to import the drug as well as local health offi-
cials; often these negotiations must be accompanied by a
prolonged dialogue with senior politicians, including
those of ministerial rank. Companies are also now
obliged to check that the pathway for providing a drug
complies with the expansive anti-bribery regimens now
operating in countries where drugs and other assistance
are given freely as part of international aid programmes.
While the processes for achieving an altruistic purpose
can be very demanding and even exasperating, ultim-
ately a successful practical outcome is likely to reward
the company in commercial terms, as well as in the eth-
ical sense as discussed above. It may weigh positively in
the balance that the real cost of compassionate use
provision for a pharmaceutical company is the cost of
production and distribution of the product, without hav-
ing to include, for example, marketing and promotional
costs.
This leads directly to another pragmatic reason,
namely that a company will need the good will of regula-
tors, medical professionals and patient organisations in
securing participants for current and future drug trials,
getting the drug on public and private formularies, hav-
ing it prescribed, and in persuading doctors to sit on its
advisory boards. Those working in healthcare or the civil
service may have chosen such career at least in part be-
cause of their interest and pleasure in doing the ‘right
thing’ through humanistic fulfilment. A company that is
perceived as morally odious may struggle to obtain the
necessary cooperation of doctors, patient organizations
and the government in bringing a drug to the market or
maintaining a lucrative therapeutic position when com-
petition looms.
Results
Compelling pragmatic, legal and ethical arguments to
convince orphan and other drug companies to provide
life-saving drugs where circumstances prevent patients
from accessing treatment. More than 50 notifications of
compassionate use programmes have been submitted to
the EMA by Member States since 2006. About 40 % re-
late to orphan drugs. As there is a compulsory register
of programmes but not of outcomes, their success is
difficult to evaluate but, for example, the French
programme expedited treatment for more than 20,000
(orphan and non-orphan) patients over a period of three
years.
Conclusions
In its foundation, the orphan drug legislation represents an
expression of non-economic societal values which seek to
realize the humanitarian purpose of providing equitable ac-
cess to treatments for rare diseases independent of their
rarity. Barriers to access based on ability to pay, are thus
contrary to these moral precepts: by the same token, com-
pelling incentives are needed to ensure that where an ef-
fective therapy is available, it can be obtained by those for
whom it was developed.
Clearly, profit is key to the viability of any company
and it would be naïve to advocate open-ended commit-
ments to charity which would cripple balance sheets.
However, introduction of tax exemptions and other mea-
sures could diminish the actual cost of compassionate
provision by companies. Moreover, provision of life-
saving drugs at reduced prices or free is likely to leave
companies with several net gains: of favourable publicity,
financial approval and fulfilled employees, as well as a
contented market reverberating with grateful patients.
Moreover, the action is not only generous; to give readily
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and to give generously is a demonstration of strength.
Compassionate and related charitable programmes pro-
mulgated by pharmaceutical manufacturers are in effect
an assertion of marketing confidence. This notional con-
cept, redolent of courageous generosity, is, in effect, a
cryptic statement of commercial power.
A strategic objective of the EU is to create a European
platform for registration of rare diseases [27]. A publicly
available EU-wide registry which lists all compassionate-use
and expanded access programmes for orphan and other
drugs, including the locations and numbers of patients
treated, would further incentivise manufacturers to engage
in compassionate provision, although we understand that
there is resistance to the initiative. Companies are in any
event obliged to maintain registries of patients who will be
prescribed their drugs after marketing approval, as a re-
sponsibility contracted with regulatory authorities and
part of their requirements for long-term pharmaco-
vigilance. It may also be that publication of the details of
treatment responses, safety and tolerability may lead to
further demands for the provision of compassionate use
by patients.
At the outset, it would be preferable to agree the terms
of compassionate provision – treatment, dosage and
duration. One aspect of ‘sustainability’ is thus met, since
the agreement would not only give patients certainty, it
would allow those treating them and their advocates to
secure reimbursed treatment in good time to ensure that
the treatment is not suddenly stopped Patient organisa-
tions may have a role in brokering standard contracts
for compassionate use provision which capture these im-
portant elements.
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